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1.1 rntroduction
Although a great dealhasbeen written about the i皿POrtanCe Of
knowledge in theories of technological iTmOVation and business
strategy, rather less has been said abc)ut how knowledg.e is
created and theway irlWhich theknowled(コe Creationprocesscan■ち
bemanaged｡ Yet,analyzing亡)rganizationsfrorn thepointofview
oftheir "knowledgecreationprocesses'rcanprovide significant
insightsintothedevelopmentofafirm'sf'dynamiccapabilities'.
The concept of f'knowledge creation-'has the potential to be
developed asa usefulmechanism for linking interpretationsof
organizational change to models of competitive technological
土nnovat土on and the evolution o至 business strateg■ies.
Organizations are not simply -rblack boxes" that process
土nformation 一一 ratheエー they are act土ve ag'ents of knowledge
creation,linked to the outside world by a wide range and
diversity of interfaces. They create knowledge dynamically in
concertwithdevelopmentsintheiroveralloperatingenvironment.
Rnowledge created by organizations might, for example, be
articulatedastechnologicalinnovationsthatinfluencebroader
patternsofchangeoutsidetheorganization･ At the sametime,
Organizationsformintegralcomponentsofthefeedbackmechanisms
that arise as consequences of that change･ Thus,.fintra"and
-'inter-70rganizationalknowledge creation processes can not be
separated in any absolute sense -- rather they represent
differentaspectsofacontinuousdialogue･
Members of organizations are part of larger networks, or
"corLmUnities of interactj一〇m一㌦ which go beyond organizational
boundaries. Thesecommunitiesincludesocialnetworksandother
information exchange activi_ti.es thaヒ shape the way in which
organizationalmembersapproachprobコernsconfrcJntedintheirday-
to-daywork･ Themedia fornetvorking thesecommunitiescanbe
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many and various -- ranglng from face-to-face meetings,
conferences, professional コOurnals. Computer databases or
whatever means enables 土nd⊥viduals to reach beyond their
immediate circumstances and access a wider body of knowledge.
Such networks permeate organizational boundaries -- thereby
enabling organi2:ationalmembersto exploit external sourcesof
knowledge in order to try and articulate new aspects of
understanding.申 These windows on the outside world I - Or
I-organizational interfaces" -- can take a wide range and
diversityofformsand influenceattitudesatalllevelsin the
organization｡ Moreover,Withtheriseofinformationtechnology
andadvancesininternationalcommunications,knowledgecreating
networkshaveanever-greaterpotentialtofunctiononaglobal
scaユ.e｡
Thisreportfocusesonhoworganizationscreateknowledgewhich
is appropriate to supporting their position in a changing
operatingenvironment･ Itdevelopsadynamicmodelofknowledge
creation and then uses case-Studies to show how the ideas
proposedrelatetoactualorganizations･ Whiletheargumentis
based on case-Study materialfrom Japanese firms, attention is
also given tO exploring how the business practices involved
differfromapproachesadoptedintheWest･ Naturally,thereare
manydifferencesbetweenJapaneseandWesternbusinesspractices
which arehighly context-specificand, in consequence, can not
beeasily⊥nterchang.edbetweennationalenvironments･ However′
the point about knowledge creat土on 土s that lt contains some
generalprincipleswhichoperateatamorebasiclevelofhuman
interaction･ Indeed,manyaspectsofknowledgecreationembrace
anever-increasingglobaldimensioninwhichJapaneseandWestern
systemshavedirect 土nterfaces. Wh土1ethe culturalcontext of
businessrelationshipsmightvary across these interfaces, the
principlesof-'interactingcornmunities'-Canbefoundbothwithin
and between the different systems･ 工n consequence′the key
themesofthereporthaveanapplicabilitythatgoesbeyondthe
Japanesebusinesspractices.
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This report is divided into three parts Which comprise a
theoretical framework, practical case-studies of knowledge
creation in Japanese organizations and conclusions. Part 1
beginsbyconsideringtheuseofknowledgeinevolutionarymodels
of technological change and then movestowards the development
ofamodeloforganizationalknowledgecreation. Thisdiscussion
isdevelopedfromprinciplesoforganizationalknowledgecreation
presented in Nonaka (1993)and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1994). A
managementmodel for promoting effective knowledQe Creation isFj
thenproposedや Thismodelfocusesonthecri.ticalroユethatcan
be played bv middle managerner3t i-n knowledge creation and is
dubbed 日払連 投阜-up-downl†(MUD)managementF Which contrasts with_
traditionalnotionsof "top-down"and -1bottom-up'Imanagement や
The case-studiesinPart2aim toillustratehow theprinciples
ofknowledgecreation canbeusedto increasecreativity inthe
pursuitofnew,moreadvantageouswaysof "doingthings"･ They
focusonthreeratherdifferentanglesofknowledge creations
In the fist instance, the case of Canon's development of its
-FHini-copieユニ' demonstrates how a mature product can be
regeneratedtocaptureanewmarketand,at thesametime,draws
attentiontothecompanyPsability to 'iearnfrompastfailuresH
thereby giving further impetus to an effective move towards
furtherdiversificationawayfromitsestablishedknowledgebase
⊥n camerasand opticaltechnolog'1eS.
The second case-study is concerned with the regeneration
creativity at the Nissan Motor Company, which had previously
become a "stagnant' Organization locked into bureaucratic
procedures thatmitigated against fresh and orlglnal thinking･
At the same time, the case-study serves to high-light an
importantcaveatarising from the fact thatcreativity comesat
a cost ln organlzatlonalresourceswhich can′on occasions′be
inconsistent with conditions associated with the prevailing
market environment･ When Japan′s rapidly expanding "bubble-f
economy burst in the late-1980S. there was a return to price-
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orientedcompetition,whichplacedNissaninanexposedposition
compared tootherJapaneseauto-makers･
Finally′thethirdcase-studyinPart2dealswithanaltogether
different kind of knowユedg'e creating. system which is not
concernedwithacompanybutratherwithatemporaryorganization
--intheform ofaresearchinstitute--thatwas,sotospeak,
builtbetweencommercialcorporations. Thisresearch institute
was part of theMinistry of 工nternationalTrade and Industry's
proコeCttOdevelopso-calledHfifthgeneration"Computingandwas
staffedbyresearchersdrawnfromrivalcompanies･ Altholjghthe
in⊥tiat土vewasdirectedtowardsbas土C′pre-competitiveresearCh′
thenotionofcollaboratingwithmembersofarivalorganization
is somewhat -1counter-cultural"to the Japanese notion of life-
long commitment to a single "family style" organization･ The
projectisofspec土al三･nterestbecalユSe土tshowshow′土nthecase
ofa high-profileproject that also liesoutside the sphere of
participatingorganizat土onsF"currentcommercialinterestsH′the
notion of sharing in common Hvision'-can be used to overcome
concerns about creating knowledgewith Houtsiders'. Temporary
ventures that are located between organizations are distanced
from the hierarchical structures that are used to confer
authoritywithintheorganization. Buildingthelevelsoftrust
necessary for the effective sharing and Creation of knowledge
requires the use of mechanisms that can over-ride tensions
between loyalty totheprojectand theinterestsofthevarious
participating companies.
Part30fthereportpresentsobse≧rvationsandconclusions. This
includes proposals for a r托0delwhich articulates the problems
thathave tobeovercomebymiddlemanagementinto supportthe
implementatioriOfeffectivekTは'WledgecreaticIri｡ =†二attemPtS tO
linkknowledgecreati10ntC the｡,rgan土zaticm'srteedt｡improvethe
dynamicaspectsofitscompetitjverJrC)CeSSeS･ Theareproposals
arepresentedasbeinganal｡grJuStC,thecc)mput･in等WCはjdFsuseof
7.蛭 匹堤fTe_xl ",whichallowsuserstfjSea二rCh,Comparean(まCorTltraSt
large quantities of textl data aTld graplj｡s by lrieanS Of a
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friendly interface･ The objective is to relate concepts and
areas of knowledge to allow a problem to be viewed from many
anglesgivingscopeforthere-juxtapositionofconceptsandthe
crystallizationofknewwaysofth土nk土ng.
1･2 Rnovledge,Technological 三mnovation and the Pursuit of
ConpetitiveAdvantage
The analysis of technological innovation and business strategy
have often made extensive use of the concept of knowledge.
Howeve工■,many Such analytical approaches stop short of issues
relatedtointra-Organizationalknowledgecreationprocessesand
their complex 土nter-relationships with external developments.
By way of background to the models of knowledge creation
developed 土n thispaper.it lshelpfulto review the treatment
of knowledge as developed in perspectives that address
competitivetechnologlCalinnovationandthepursuitofstrateg.1C
advantage.
Theincreasinginterestinknowledgeasaunitofanalysisinthe
study of technological innovation is partly a reflection of
increasesinthecomplexity ofadvancedtechnologyand therise
of an "infomation ager.･ =n medieval times,innovations were
articulatedintermsofpracticalachievementswhichmademinimal
useof .'book learning'･ Knowledgenetworkingwaslargely based
onpersonalcontactand sharedexperience. Apprenticeslearned
from theirmastersandthediffusionofnew techniquesdepended
tosomeconsiderableextentonthemovementofindividuals. The
functions perfomed by the basic elements of preva土1土ng
technologiesWererelativelyeasyforanonlookertoappreciate･
Chance trial and error led to the emplrical development of
technologleS that Hworked" long before they were 一understood■･
DuringBritain'S =ndustrialRevolution,arapidexpansioninthe
exploitation of empirically-based technology in the pursuit of
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more competitiveproduction processeshelped to lead theworld
intoaneweraofmanufacturing. Asmarketsexpanded,technology
bothfilledthegapthatstoodinthewayofmorecost-effective
production and led to the development of new products･
Schumpeter, writing in 1911, identified the discontinuity and
imbalancecausedbytheentrepreneurialinvestment土ninventions
asthebasicimpulseo王developmentforthecapitalisteconomy.
Inventions,whichhadnointrinsicvalueintheirownright,were
giveneconomicsignificancebyentrepreneurswhousedinvestment
to translatethenewideasintosomeformoftangiblecom ercial
advantage. The entrepreneur has to identify and satisfy the
needsofthemarket: Hproductionfollowsneeds;itlssotospeak
pulledafterthem-f(Schumpeter:1911p12)･ Yet theseneedsare
subject to constant change and; .7‥.everymethod ofproduction
inuseatagiventimebowstoeconomicappropriateness"(ibid:
p13)･ Facilitatingthe "coupling"ofknowledge (articulated in
terms ofproducts or services)tomarket needs is at the very
core the innovation process. However, the characteristics of
knowledge associated with many ares of technology has changed
dramatically.
As the twentieth-century progressed,many areas of technology
became far more complex and pract土cal -■know how"required the
supportofformaltraining,booklearningand formalrecordsof
past progress. At the same time, some aspects of commercial
technologybecamemorecloselyrelatedwithscience. =ncertain
instances,sciencehadprogressedto thepointWhereitcouldbe
used to shape the development ofpractical technologies. For
example,thedevelopmentoftheearlyUSelectricalindustryand
the Geman chemical industry illustrated a distinctive
intem ingling of science (in the form of l'know whyr') with
technologlCa1 -■know how". Certain aspects of scientific
knowledge suddenly had a legitimate place in the knowledge
creatingnetwork･ At thesametimer theincreaseincomplexity
ofcertainaspectsoftechnologygaverisetoaneedforresearch
and developmentdepartments to promotea greaterunderstanding
of corporate technology and provide scope for improving its
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reliability and advancing the frontier of best practice
perfomance.
In advancing beyond medieval empiricism and the use of skills
derivedmainly from personalexperi_ence, technology underwenta
fundamental change. It became more dependant on formal
documentationasanetvorkingmedium. The significanceofthis
changeisreflectedin Brownrs (1992)ar°-ument that thedocument
as one of the most powerful technologies ever inventede
Documentsprovidearatchet formankindFsknowledgeandenables
土ndiv土duals to extend their reach so that people who not have
direct accessto each other can interact. Theword text comes
from the same latin root as the word textile,namely .Ttexere"
meaning toweave. Thusdocumentsemerged asboth an early and
enduringmedium forrecordingandnetworkingknowledge･
Zn 1943,Schumpeter noted how it had becomepossible to invest
in invention. AccordingtoFreeman,theprofessionalism ofR&D
represented a "research revolution.tin which 'lhigh technologyf-
or "advancedtechnologyT'becamebasedonaformalandsystematic
body of learning (Freeman:1982 p15)･ After the Second World
War,sciencewasheld inparticularly high regard in theUSand
leading European economies･ The rapid development of nuclear
technologyranti-biotic drugstlasersrradarTsynthetic fibers
and jetenginesPromotedawidespreadbeliefinthenotionthat
technologicaldevelopment could be based on the application of
scientific discoveries･ Howevertby the 1960s itwasbecoming
increasinglyapparent thatcountries,suchastheUSandUKwhich
investedheavilyinbasicsciencelWerenotmatchingtheeconomic
growthratesofJapanandAustraliawherescientificexpenditure
was significantly lower･ A number of empirical studies of
innovation conducted in the 1960s and 1970S evaluated the
relative influence of 'Ttechnology pushn and 'need pullf' as
sourcesofinnovation. Whiletheresultsweremixed,aconsensus
gradually emerged that innovation had multiple sourcesrwith a
generalemphasisonthepursuitoftechnologiestailoredtothe
development of anticlpated customer needswhlch′on occasions.
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Could be tempered or redirected by slgnificant scientific or
technologicalbreakthroughs (Langrishetall1972)･
Use and redeslgnrmodification and improvementallpromote the
developmentofnewideasandleadtechnologleS tO thepointwhere
themarket judgesthem tobe "mature'in the sense thatdemand
doesnothave abuoyancywhich 土s sufficient to 土nduce further
innovation. This notion of a "pathH of related improvement
innovationshasbeen referred to by Nelson andWinter in terms
of a "natural trajectory" which follows from a particular
technological regime. They illustrate this concept with the
exampleoftheDC-3aircraftwhichwasdesignedinthe1930sand
definedatechnologicalregime(identifiedbythecharacteristics
of metal skin,low wing and piston engine propulsion)which
guided aircraftdesign formore than twodecades･
The tendency of technology to evolve within a set of guiding
constraints bears some similarities with Xuhn′S concept of
scientificparadigms(Kuhn‥1970)･ Dosi(1982)hasexploredthis
relationshipusingtheconceptofl'technologlCalparadigms"which
approximatetowhatXuhnsawasthestab⊥1土tyofI-nomalscience-I
whichguidesgradualprogress･ Occasionally,anewwayofdoing
thingswillemergethatissufficientlypromisingtoattractthe
attention ofan enduringgroup ofadherents (theequivalent of
a"newknowledgecreatingnetwork")･ pursuitofresearchinthis
newparadigmthenfollowsanagendathatisshapedbyaccumulated
experience,whichprovidesabasisfor土nterpretingtheproblem
and indicatingpossibleapproachestoitssolution･ Thatisto
say,past progress suggests a "line of attackl. for future
enquiry･ Znthisway,particularavenuesoftechnologyacquire
a -'momentumofdevelopment'whichcanhaveapowerfulexclusion
effect over alternative approaches that might well embody a
greaterlong-term potential,buthavenotbeendevelopedtothe
pointwheretheiradvantagesare clear.
Theextent towhichthereareactualparadigm shiftsrasopposed
to the cumulative synthesisofwhathasgone before,ismatter
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ofsomedebate･ At theheartoftheproblem isthequestionof
whatactually constitutesa "breakthrough"･ Forexample,while
scient土flcdiscoveriesthatsubsequentlyspawnnewtechnologleS
are often referred to as 'lradical' advances,the supporting
science that led to the discovery is typlCally the product of
successiveincrementaladvances. However,oncenewtraコeCtOries
are established (whether by 'evolutionary"or 'Trevolutionary'
means) they g.enerally have a powerful exclusion effect over
alternativeapproacheswhichmightbepromisingbutare,asyet,
unproven･Moreover,astrajectoriesgathermomentum,thiseffect
generallybecomesmorepronouncedasalternativeapproacheshave
toovercomeag■reaterbarrier･
In evolutionary models of innovation, the development a
particular avenue of technology follows is both guided and
stimulated by user requirements･ Like technology, user
requirementschangeover time andmap out,whatmay be called,
a l'corridor"of increasing expectations,Which rise in concert
with parallel improvements in technological performance
characteristics (Georghiou et a1 1976, Ray et al:1989)･ For
example, thecorridorofuserexpectationsrelated to transport
technologies been extended by both improvements in particular
technolog-1Calreg.1meS一一SuChautomobiles一一andthedevelopment
ofqualitativelydifferentcombinationsoftechnologytocreate
a new mode of transportation -- as illustrated by practical
realizationofaviation. Elevateduserexpectationsbothfollow
in theWake oftechnologicaladvancesand actasan inducement
tomake further progress. Hence the corridorofevolvinguser
requirementsdefinesan evolv土ng 一arena of competltlon一with⊥n
whichrivalfirmsviewitheach othertocapturealargershare
ofthemarketby producingmore innovative products -- thereby
biddingupthecurrencyofprevailingbestpracticetechnology･
Thisoccursto thepointwherematurity isreached and further
improvements can not be translated into improved competitive
perfomance･
Neverthelessrtechnological maturity is by no means a fixed
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state. New technologies,Or established technologies in a
hitherto unrelated area,might provide a means of supplying
improvedperformancecharacteristics -- therebystimulatingthe
further development of a technology that was considered to be
mature･ The famous 'sailing ship effect'f illustrates this
principal by drawing attention to the fact that sailing ship
perfomance improved at an accelerated rate in the face of
competition from steam ships. Thus,it is quite possible for
more than one technology to exist in the same "CorridorT'or
"competitive arena' until a dominant technological regime
establishesitselfasbeingmoreadvantageousintermsofmeeting
userrequirements.
A further factor affecting the prevailing status of a given
technology is its associated network of complementary
technologiesand services. AsRosenberg haspointed out, user
perceptions of the automobile are affected by complementary
activities ranging from a network of service stations to an
extensive system of paved roads (Rosenberg･' 1976 pl10)･ =n
consequence,changesincomplementaryfactorsmightreshapeuser
requirementsandtherebyshifttherelativestandingofdifferent
productsandtechnologleS.
Compet土tive土nnovat土on土saboutsustainedperformance土ntheface
ofadynamicchanges in themyriad of factorsthatmake up the
firm's operating environment･ Environmental change can both
threatenthecorecompetenceofafirmorgeneratenew scopefor
furtherdimensionsofdevelopment -- forexampleby Hbending.Ia
corridor of development ln user requirements towards the core
competenciesofthe firm･ Thedramaticincreasesinoilprices
thattookplacein 1973forexample Ttbent'partofthecorridor
ofuserpreferencesforautomobilestowardsanincreaseddemand
formorefuel-efficientcars･ 工nconsequenceJauto-makerswith
the g■reatest competenc土es in fuel-efficient cars were more
favorably placed to exploit this change in the market
environment.
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Zn recent years,interest in the processes by which firms
interact with environmental changes has been instrumental in
elevatingbusinessstrategyto thepositionofbeingamainstream
management discipline･ Effective strategy involves the
realization of "differencesthatmake a difference'to a firms
abilitytocompete･ 工t土sabout thepursuitandexploitationof
diversity in order to cope with an ever changing operating
environment. Asearlierremarks⊥nthispaperhavestressed,new
waysofdoing thingshave to embody some form ofadvantage,if
theyaretobe selected forretentionand survival. Porterhas
pointed out that,Withoutauniqueadvantageoveritsrivals,a
businesshasnoreasontoexist(批)ntgomeryandPorter:1991p6)･
Yet the criteria for Selection are rarely stable and, 土n
turbulent technological and market environments, Can represent
an ever changing Pattern Of constraints and opportunities･
Meeting prevailing and future patternsofuser preferences for
particular combinations ofproduct performance character土st⊥Cs
at appropriate prices isan uncertain bus土ness･ Themagnitude
and direction ofchanges in the .corridor'ofuser preferences
arefrequentlyhardtopredictaccurately･ Theyrepresentmoving
targets that can all to often become blurred as previously
distinct technologies and markets inter-mingle to redefine the
arena of competition. At the time′ factors such as reg.ulatory
chang■es′shifts in relative prices and the vlc土ssitudes of
fashioncanallservetoshapeorredirect theevolutionofuser
preferences.
Thetreatmentofknowledgeinmodelsofinnovationandbusiness
strategy have often focused on the institutional sources of
knowledge (ie whether it comes from within the fin itself,a
competitor, a hitherto unrelated technology, public domain
scienceetc)andtheconsequencesofusingparticularpiecesof
knowledge-iethe'revealedperformance"thatcanbeattributed
to theexploitationofspecificaspectsofknowledge･ However,
theytendtoignorearatherdifferentquestionwhichrelatesto
the nature of knowledge creation processes within the
institution, together with the related issue of how these
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processescanbemanagedamidadynamicenvironment. Ztisthis
questionofwhathappenswithintheorganizationliesatthecore
ofthepresentdiscussionoforganizationalknowledgecreation･
Traditionalmodelsoforganizationsfrequentlyignorethedynamic
interaction between an organization and its environment.
Instead,theysimplyportrayorganizationsassystemswhichsolve
problemsbyprocessinginformation･ Whilethisapproachmaybe
useful in certain circumstances, it can be argued that it
embodies a rather static perspect土Ve that pays excessive
attentiontowhatisgiventO theorganizationwithoutdueregard
towhat it creates. =n reality, both theorganization and the
environmentare subjecttocontinualchange. Thischangemeans
that the organization has to mobilize the creativity of its
members to generate a level of diversity that is commensurate
with sustaining the competitive advantages necessary for
continued survival. Thistaskhingesonaquestionofbalance.
Whileastagnantorganizationmightbewashedawaybyturbulence
initstechnologlCalormarketenvironment′excess土vecreativity
can be inappropriate in a relatively static operating
environment. 工nconsequence.organizationshavetobeselective
andbuild creativitytoanextentwhich土sapp工･Opr土ate to their
resource base,on the one hand,and prevailing environmental
circumstances,ontheother. Successfulmediationbetweenthese
two conflicting themes is at the very foundation of effective
strategy formation･ Rnowledgehastobecreatedwithregard to
thechangingPatternsOfconstraintsandopportunitiesthatexist
inthe fim ′soperating environment.
1･3 Rnovledgeand 工nfomation
Before addressing the development of organizational knowledge
creation, it worth taking some time to consider the nature of
knowledge･ Thereawidespreadtendencytoequateknowledgewith
"informationHandview itasacommoditywhich shouldbesought
with aview to exploitation･ YetrWhile the tens 'knowledge"
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and I.information'are often used interchangeably, for present
purposes it 土s helpful to consider some of the differences
betweenthetwo concepts.
Partoftheconfusionsurroundingthenatureofinfomationcan
be traced from a distinction between its 一syntacticH and
"semantlc一 dimensions. Wh土1e the syntactic dimension of
information relates to quantity (as measured 土n the bits and
bytesofcomputertechnologyornumberofwordsinabook),its
semanticqualitiesareconcernedwithmeaning･ Thisdifference
can be seen in the case of telephone bills,where the amount
charged is related to time taken and distance covered but is
independentofthecontentoftheconversat土on - threeminutes
spent exchanging trivia costs the same as three minutes of
serious discussion. From the point of view of knowledge
creation, thevalueofinformationisboundupwithitsmeaning
to the lndiv土duals concerned (ie semantic qualities) and the
extent towhich it canbeused tobuild some form ofadvantage
throughadeeper levelofunderstanding.
Whencomparedto土nformatlon′knowledgehasmoretodowiththe
levelofpersonalunderstanding- whichneednotbeinanyway
proportional to the volume of raw data･ Moreover, knowledge
creation can be conceptuali2:ed in terms of building shared
understanding amongst communities of individuals who are
concerned with a particular problem or group of problems and
dependson the exchange ofmeaningfulinformation･ As Schrage
haspointedout,effectiveco7nmunicationinvolvescollaboration
to sharethemeaningsthatcanbeabstracted from information･
People have to use words, symbols. 土mages model5 --
whatever they can get their hands and minds on 一一 to
constructrelevantmeaningsfromavailableinformationand
their individual expertise･ Don't forget that the
linguistic root of communication is the latin verb
communicare--whichdoesnotmean "tocornmunicater'but "to
shareH. Collaboration takes comunication back to its
- 13-
roots.
(Schrage=1990p6)
工nthepresentcontext.infomationmaybe seenasamedium for
facilitating knowledge creation through collaboration･ Deeper
understanding can be derived from the acquisition of,what
Polanyihasreferredtoas,"explicit'and f'tacit.'understanding
(polany土=1966)･ Explicitknowledgerelatesto thingswhichare
Hknown" and can be shared easily between individuals･ 工ts
essential qualities can Hcaptured-Iin a cod土f土ed or schematic
form that allowsits subsequent transferto other indivlduals･
Bycontrast, "tacit"knowledgeisconcernedwithanindividual's
intrinsic feelings which,because of their very nature,are
personalanddifficult toexpressinamannerthatcanbereadily
understood by others･ 工trepresents concepts thatare to some
extent hidden and it isquite possiblethat theymighteven be
hiddenfromtheindividualinvolved! Thatistosay,individuals
candraw on tacitunderstandingwithout being in anyway aware
of the complicated information processing procedures that are
requiredtorealizesuchanachievement. Suchanunderstanding
might allow tasks to be performed -- like riding a bicycle --
Without the土nd土vidualbeingawareoftheenomouscomplexityof
the mental processes involved･ This represents a I.technical.I
aspect of tacit knowledge which involves the Hknow how"
associated with spec土f土c skillsand crafts. However. there is
alsoa "Cognitive"dimensiontotacitknowledgethatrelatesto
way ⊥nwhich 土nd土vidualsinterpret theirenv土ronment･
ThecognitiveelementsoftacitknowledgecenteronwhatJohnson-
Laird (1983)hasreferredtoasthe-'mentalmodels-'usedbyhuman
beings to create and manipulate images in their minds･ These
workingmodelsincludeconceptualparadigmsandjudgementswhich
enableindividualstoform Hperspectives'forinterpretingtheir
environment･ AsNesbithasnoted三一tmuchofwhatMichaelPolanyl
hascalled 'tacitknowledge'isexpressible --in so faras it
is expressible at al1 -- in metaphort- (Nesb土t三 1969 p5ト
24etaphors provide a powerful tool for building the conceptual
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Structures that are used to manlpulate and develop tacit
understanding･ In Lakoff and Johnson words: .'The essence of
metaphor isunderstanding and the experiencing of one thing in
termsofanother"(LakoffandJohnson:1980p5)･ Asamethodof
perception,metaphor uses comparison rather than the synthesis
of com on attributes -- it is a creative process which links
concepts thatmightordinarilybe farapartinthe 土ndiv土dual's
mind.
Cognitiveimagescanbedevelopedandrefinedthroughtheuseof
analogies. Whilethetermsmetaphorandanalogyareoftenused
as substitutes for each other′ it is possible to draw a
distinction between their respective meanings. Zn essence,
metaphorsareformedthroughperceptionsofimagesandallowthe
free association of ideas. By contrast,analogies enable the
functionalassociat土Onofnewconceptsorsystemstobeexplored
by reference to mechanisms that are already understood･ They
providescopeforcurrentproblemscanbeaccessedbyreference
toestablishedknowledgeand insodoingbridgethegapbetween
metaphorical images and loglC･ Thus,while a metaphor might
providescopeforthefirstintellectual.']ump",analogiesCreate
scopetoforofferingfunctionalexplanationsofhowthingsmight
operate at a system level. Through a combination ofmetaphors
andanalogies,individualsusethecognitivedimensionoftacit
knowledge to form interpretations of contemporary events and
visionsforthe future.
1･4 TheBasisofRnovledgeCreation
The dynamic thrust ofknowledge creation processes center on a
continualtwo-waydialoguebetweenexplicitandtacitknowledge.
Thisdialogueoccursbothinthemindsofindividualsand (asthe
next section Will explain)acrossknowledge creating networks･
The tacit-explicit interchange helps to express the hidden
dimensionsof'■frontier"thoughtprocessesandtherebyallowsthe
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Figure1ModesoftheKnowledgeCreation
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articulation of embryonic thoughts that can be shared and
developed･ Such an interaction between tacit and explicit
knowledge can be seen as representing the "epistemologlCal'f
dimension oftheknowledge creation processes. Although it is
difficult toclassifyactualknowledgeasbeingeitherentirely
tacitorentirelyexpl土C土t,ataconceptuallevel土tispossible
to produce a two-by-two matrix which contains four modes of
interaction -- or 'conversion' -- between tacit and explicit
knowledge･ This is shovm in figure 1 and comprises knowledge
conversion= (i)from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge;
(2)from explicit to tacit; (3)from tacit toexplicit; and (4)
from tacit totacit.
The first mode of conversion involves the assimilation of
existingexplicitknowledgetoproducenewexplicitknowledgeas
forexamplemightoccurinthecaseofareportwhichisproduced
onthebasisofinformationcollectedfromalibrary･ Thisfom
of knowledge conversion will be referred to here as
"combinationf',since existing knowledge is being combined to
produce somethingnew through a processof sorting,adding and
re-configuringexistingexplicitknowledge.
tn the second knowledge conversion mode,explicit knowledge is
T'internalized" by individuals. This is a form of learning
processwhereindividualshaveaccesstoexplicitknowledgeand,
asaconsequence.areabletoextendtheirtacitunderstanding.
In such acase,explicitknowledgemighttriggeranassociation
of tacit ideas and advance the frontier of the ind土vidual's
overalltacitknowledge･ (Thismodeofconversionapproximates
tonotionsof "1earn土ng'"and′from atheoreticalpointo王vlew.
represents the common ground betweenmodels of 'organizational
learning'fand themore wide-ranging COnCePt Of "Organizational
knowledge creation-Iwhich contains a further three modes of
knowledge creation･)
Theoppositeofinternali2:ationis"externalization"whichoccurs
in the thirdmode ofknowledge creation as individuals seek to
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translatetheirtacitunderstandingintotangibleconceptswhich
can be articulated in terms of explicit knowledge･ Such a
challengecanbeamajorProblem fortheproducersofso-called
-texpert systemsH -- which aim to capture the expertise of an
expert in a computerprogram. Theperformanceof such systems
isgovernedbytheextent towhichtheexpert'sknowledgecanbe
externalizeand codified intheprogram･
Thefinalformofknowledgeconversioncentersonthesharingof
tacitknowledgeandisinmanywaysoneofthemostchallenging
aspectsofknowledgecreation. Althoughideasareformedinthe
minds of ind土viduals′土nteract土on between individuals can be
crucial to the mobilization and exchange of tacit knowledge･
This is a social process and the conversion process is one of
"socialization一. Social '■cornmunitiesof interaction"form the
means by which tacit knowledge is shared and created･ An
apprentice learns from the craftsman not simply be words but
throughobservation,imitationandpractice. Inbusiness,"on-
the-job-training'fusesasimilarprinciple.
Tacit knowledge creation is an a continuous activity that
embodieswhatBateson hasreferred to asan tanalog.ue"quality
(Bateson:1973)･ Sharing■tacit knowledg■e 土nvolves a continual
struggle tobuildmutualunderstanding andmightmake frequent
reference to metaphors and analogies. It is driven the by
sharing of ideas that are the forefront of creativity. This
involves a kind of "parallel processing.I so that different
dimensions of the knowledge being shared can be processed
simultaneously. Zt hasa "livingquality"associatedwith the
unfolding of new dimensions of understanding･ By contrastr
explicit knowledge has a packaged "digitall quality･ It is
f.free-standing'fand can be used when required on a sequential
bas土S･ However,without a com on environment,土t tends to be
difficult for one person to put themselves.so to speak,土n
another person's shoes and gain a full appreciation of the
knowledge.
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Brown (1992)has argued thatl･ "The organizations of the future
willbe'knowledgerefineries'inwhichemployeeswillsynthesize
understanding and interpretations from the sea of infomation
that threatensto floodthem 至rom alュsides｡‖ He subsequently
goeson to suggest that, in a knowledge refinery, workersneed
to collaborate w土th both the present and the past･ While
collaborationwiththepresentisaboutsharingtacitknowledge,
collaboration with the past draws on experience gained from
previousWaysofdoingthings.
Building links with the past relies on the use of explicit,
codified knowledge articulated in documents mixed with the
distilled judgement of past experience･ This information is
accessed on a secTuential basis by consulting sources such as
arch土vesJlibrariesanddatabases. 工ntheprocess701dmemories
mightbe triggered and help to build a fresh interpretation of
currentevents｡
Making sense of contemporary events involves rapid pa叫
Processinqofmultipleinfomat土Onsources･ Suchsk⊥11Senable
familiar faces to be recognized in an instant･ A first
impressionofcomplexpicturescanbe fomed long■beforepoints
ofdetailareassessed.
1･5 A spiralofRnovledg.eCreation
tnadditionto theepistemologlCalinteractionbetweentacitand
explicit knowledg･e′ 土t ⊥s also possible that there will be an
expansion in the "community of interaction'･ Ifnew knowledge
is relevant to the needs of the organization, it is likely to
permeate through groups and divisions and thereby extend the
community of interaction dealing with that knowledge･ New
knowledgethathasapotentialtosupportmoreadvantageousWays
ofdoingthingsislikelytoberetainedasasubjectforfurther
debatewithin the network and may also lead to an extension of
the com unity of interaction. For example. what eventually
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F igure2 SpiralofOrganizationalKnowledgeCreation
Epistemologia王
dimension
Explicitknowledg e
Tacit
know ledg e
Individual Group Organization lnter-organization
Knowledgelevel
Ontological
dimension
proves to be a successful product might emanate from a R&D
departmentandgradually acquireagreatercircleofinterested
parties within the organization as the dimensions of its
potential impact become more clear. As news of the emerging
product travels beyond the organization, the circle will grow
stillwiderembracingcompetitors,customers,firmsdealingwith
complementarytechnologiesand soon. Thusthenetworkwillgo
beyondtheorlglnalI-hardcore'fofknowledgecreatorstoinclude
thosethatareinsomewayaffectedbytheexploitationofthat
knowledg■e.
Thisgrowthinthecorununityofinteractionrepresentswhatcan
be called an HontologlCal'Fdimension toknowledge creation and
forms the horizontal axis to the spiral shown in figure 2･
However, 土t should be emphasized that 土n reality there is no
reasontosupposethat therewillbelinearsequenceofexpansion
-- starting from the individual, thenprogressing to the group
andsubsequentlytotheorganizationandbeyond. Thecommunity
of interaction could span departmental and organizational
boundariesfrom theoutset. Possiblemembersofthiscommunity
suchassuppliers,customersandcompetitorsmightallenterthe
knowledgecreatingsplralatanytime. 工nthisconnection,Brown
and Duguid (1991) have dram attention to the remarkable
disparity that frequently exists between the way individuals
actually collaborate with each other and the patterns of
com un土cat土on that are articulated in terms of official
organizational charts and management handbooks detailing
'lappropriate procedures'f･ Their point is that actual
communication networks center on 'evolving communities of
practice'whichreflectthewaypeopleactuallyworkonaday-to-
daybas⊥S･
From the point of view of managing Organizational knowledge
creation it is 土mportant to be awa工･e Of the true location of
particlpantSintherelevantcommunityoflnteraction･ Somefom
of "map.I of actual corLmunication channels is needed,which
detailswhatreallyhappensasopposed to theoriespresented in
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Organizationalflow diagramsand so on･ Thenext step isthen
tobuildanappropriatemechanism tofacilitatethesharingand
creation of knowledge. Nevertheless, this is all too often
easiersaid thandone･ AsSchragehasnoted:
･･.toadisturbinglylargedegree,mostorganizationslack
the co11aborat土Ve infrastructures that enable people to
share their talents 土n ways that satisfy the 土ndividuals
need for expression and the organization's imperative for
results.
(Schrage=1990pxxiii)
We will now turn to a cons⊥derat⊥on of how appropriate
collaborationmechanismscanbeestablishedtomanagetheprocess
oforganizationalknowledgecreation.
1.6 The班anagementofOrganizationalRnovledgeCreation
Znthefinalanalysis,knowledgecreationdependsonindividual
creativity, the organization has to support the quality of
knowledge held by individuals and increase their potential for
creativity which can be used to develop organlzat土onal
perfomance･ A lack of variety can mean that the ind土Ⅴ土dual
simply doesnot gain the tacit experience that isnecessary to
promoteorlglnalthinking･ Forthisreason,Japanesecompanies
oftenadoptapolicyof jobrotationtoenableemployeesto see
theorgani2:ationfromavarietyofperspectives･ Howevertsimply
raising the levelofvariety in an individual'sactivitiesmay
achieve little 土fthe experiencesarecompletely un工･elated and
there is little opportunity for them to be HfusedH to form new
concepts･ Rather,enhanced tacit knowledge ismore likely to
result from the individuals ability to "indwell'. in the
experienceheldbymembersoftheorganizationthatareengaged
in relevant tasks･ The individualhas to be in a position to
access the relevant 'knowledge creating networks" and
"com unit土esofinteract土on一So thatwhat 土sobserved doesnot
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exist as mere lnfomatlon but instead has context and meaning
that can be assimilated into accumulated personal experience･
In essence, the individualhas to go beyond being a distanced,
passiveobserverofnewcircumstancesandinsteadachievealevel
offamiliaritythatiscapableo王supportingactive土nvolvement
inthenewissuesandchallenges･ Activeparticipationgenerates
thepotentialforthe土nd土Ⅴ土dualto 至orm I-newperspect土ves■and
thought processes associated with what Schon has described as
"reflection in action" (1983) whereby reflecting whilst
undergoing new experience can stimulate the crystallization of
new ideas. As Schon observes: -■When someone reflectswhile in
action,hebecomesaresearcherin thepracticecontext. He is
not dependant on the categories of established theory and
technique,but constructs a new theory of the unlque CaSe一
(Sc也on;1983p68ト
AnimportantdimensiontotheproductionofknowledgeinJapanese
firms is .redundancy of knowledgef'･ Redundant knowledge is
shared by individuals can provide a I.common currencyf that
enables one person can enter person'S "arena of thinking'and
offeradvice. Thereductionofinformationdifferentialsenables
individuals to 土nteract on more equal tem s′ wh土ch makes
organizationalknowledgemorefluidandeasiertoputintoplace･
Examples of 'learning by intrusion'. are common in Japanese
organi2:ations. Thus,in addition to knowledge that is,touse
amilitarymetaphor,on ■-act土Veservicet'inanind土vidual′sday-
to-dayactivities,thereisapassive"reservearmy"ofknowledge
that can be deployed′should appropriate circumstances ar⊥se･
Japan′s tradition of l土fetime employment with the same
organization is instrumental in building high levels of trust
between organizationalmembers. Knowledge can be shared on a
long term basis and so the creation of lredundant knowledgel'
mightbedeployedoveraperiod ofseveralyears--making ita
potentially moreworth-while investment thanwould be the case
in conditionsofhigh staffturnover. Moreover,itisunlikely
that the corporate f'knowledge pool' will leak to other
organizations on account of an individual changing jobs･
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(Gainingknowledgeby '一PoachingHemployeesisrareinJapanand
generally consideredtobeunethical･) Theconceptofthe f'the
group",WhichpemeateseverylevelofJapanesesociety,土sheld
togetherbythe "glueofsharedknowledgeHandtinthiscontextr
redundant knowledge is a form l'reserve binding force"Iwhich
might be brought in to play if environmental circumstances
change･ ThusT redundant knowledge gives the group greater
resilience in the face of an adverse or unexpected tu工■n Of
events.
Productdevelopment 土nsuccessfulJapanesefinsofteninvolves
overlap and extensive collaboration between different sections
oftheorganization･ Moreover,teammembersmightmovewiththe
project "rugby style"as it progressesfrom conception towards
fruition --in somecasesstaffmightactually follow aproject
through all the departmental locations associated with its
development:thereby increasingthechancethatsolutionstobe
current problems can be triggered by reference to first-hand
experience of earlier diff土culties･ By contrast′ Western
approaches often involve considerable demarkation between
departmentswhichhave rigid boundaries. There iswide-spread
support for the idea thatprocedures shouldbewelldocumented
andlessreliantontacitknowledg.ewhichcouldbelostwiththe
movement of a key ind土viduaL Product development can be
characteri21edasbeingmoreanalogoustoa lrelayrace.'inwhich
the"baton"ofproコeCtdevelopment土shandedoverfromdepartment
to department with minimal interaction. S土nce 'socializat土on●■
isimpededbysucharigiddivisionoflabor,thedegreeoftacit
knowledgethatcanmovewiththeprojectisrelatively limited･
Redundantknowledgeand f■rugbystyle一developmentcancontribute
to the speed at which Japanese firms are able to develop new
products･ Zt promotes good communication channel between
departmentswhichcanusedtosmooththeproコeCt′sprogressand
bringarangeofexpertisetothesolutionofproblemsthatmight
occur･ Forexample,insightsfromthemarketingdepartmentmight
be able to provide an input to the way in which a p工･Oduct土on
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problem is solved. thereby el土mlnatlng the delays that would
otherwise follow from waiting for theproduction department to
act independently prior to offering feedback, This type of
collaboration between departments provides flexibility and
enables concepts to be realized quickly. although the lack of
strict specificationsat each stagemeans that there isa need
to guard against the riskofconfusion thatmightbe caused by
design Changesorotheralterations･
工fknowledg.ecreationistoproceedeffectively′thereisaneed
forsomefom of tfocusingfo工■CeHtochannelcreativity towards
prevailingcommercialrequirements･ Thischannellingeffectcan
be seen in terms of 'fcreative chaos.f of the type that is
generated naturally when the organization faces some form of
crisis,suchasadecl土ne土nperformanceduetoashiftinmarket
requirements or the improved performance of competitors･ The
senseofurgencyassociatedwitharealcrisiscanbegenerated
artificiallywhenleadersofanorganizationpresenttheirstaff
withchallenginggoals. Creativechaoscanincreasetension in
theorganizationand focusattentionon formingand solvingnew
goals･ Visionsfrom seniormanagementcanbeusedtostimulate
theconstructionofnew problemsandobjectives･ Thismightbe
implemented by "internal competition"between rival approaches
toexploring.aparticularproblem inanattempt toidentifythe
mostrelevantapproach･
Thebalancebetween ■'redundantknowledgeH′whichisanexpansive
entity that can grow without any natural limit, and "creative
chaos", which is a compressive, focussing force, can be
articulated by Ashby′s notion of Hrequis土te variety" (Ashby;
1956)･ Thisrelates to thenotion ofan appropriatedegreeof
diversity which varies according to prevailing environmental
circumstances. Inmodelsoforganizationalknowledgecreation,
requisite variety represents a idealized 一best case-Ilevel of
diversitywhichstrikesanappropriatebalancebetweencreativity
and com ercialimperatives･
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1･7 Self-organizingProjectTeams
Articulating new concepts formed by individuals to produce
knowledge which is useful at the organizational level can be
achieved by the fomation ofa self一〇rganlzing■project team or
'task forceH. Suchteamsareacommonmethodofdevelopingnew
products in Japan and represent an attempt to create
interdisciplinary groups that comprise representatives from
various I.knowledge creating"networkswhich can be brought to
bearonaparticularproblem. AsBrom andDuguid (1991)pointed
out, day-to-day problems frequently prompt individuals to
collaborate in informal groups and exchange ideas frequently
through the exchange so-called "war stories" based on past
experience. Thesewarstoriesallowaproblemtobeviewedfrom
differentanglesandachievethe"hypertext"facility,mentioned
intheintroduction.wherebycomparisonandre-contextuauzat土on
of existing knowledge can lead to new understanding. The
challeng.eformanag■ementistousetaskforceslnsuchawaythat
the collaboration that exists on an informal basis (in
commun土t土esofpractice)canbeputonamoreformalfooting.and
directed towards organizational objectives. This requires
buildingprojectteamsWhichincluderelevantmemberswhocanbe
managed in such a Way that they work effectively together in
order to create the levelsof socializat土On necessary to solve
a target problem or, if necessary, redefine the target.
Effectivesocializationdependsontheexistenceofmutualtrust
between members and the rapid building of shared perspectives
through continuousface-to-facedialogue.
ObservationsofJapanesecompanieshaveindicatedthatsuccessful
projectteamsgenerallycomprisebetween 10and 30individuals,
withtheupperlimitarising･becauseofconstraintsonthelevel
ofinteraction thatcan be achieved betweenmembers. The team
typlCally includes4or5 "coremembers"whohavecareerswhich
includea range of job functions. Thespan ofteam activities
need not be confined to organizational activities. This is
especiallytruewhereprojectteamactivitiesincludetheseeking
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out and exploitation of environmental knowledg.e. 工n Japanese
fi川 s,suppliersofpartsand componentsaresometimesinvolved
intheearlystagesofproductdevelopment,whilecustomersmight
be involvedwithproductplanningprocesses･
Oncetheteam hasbeen formedandmutualtrustestablished′ the
immediate challenge is the articulation of project COnCePtS
through the externalization of relevant tacitknowledge. Here
the use ofmetaphors and analogies Can be made operational by
recoursetodialogueanddialecticaldebate. Thismightseekto
promote a multi-faceted interchange which allows scope for
revision or negation. ParticIPantS Should be able to express
their ideas in a candid and openmanner. Negation for itsown
sake′which土seasybutnotnecessarilyproduct土ve′Shouldbeis
discouragedinfavorofconstructivecriticismbasedonreasoned
arguments. Dialecticdebatetendstobemosteffectiveifthere
istemporalcontinuity toallow a splrallingofaffirmationand
negationinthepursuitofnewknowledge. Thisprocesscanoften
be stimulated by the volatile and dramaticnature ofdialogue･
Zn a self organizing project team, redundant knowledge will
typically play a major role promotingmutualunderstanding and
buildingtrust. 班oreover,astheteamprogresses. apparently-
redundantknowledgemight suddenly findanicheforapplication
and feed into the creation of new conceptual approaches. 工n
consequence′moreteammembersareexposedtothepossibilityof
assuming a position at the forefrontofthe knowledge creating
spiral. This notion is consistent with what McCulloch has
describedasthe "principleofredundancy ofpotentialcommand"
(McCulloch: 1985)･ Under this principle,leadership varies
accordingtoprevailingcircumstancesand allpartsofa system
areassumedtoembody the samepotentialforassuminga leading
role.
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1.8 Xiddle-up-DownXanagenent
Notions of "top-dom " and Hbottom-up-Imanagement pervade the
literatureonmanagementscience･ Bothtermsrelatetotheflow
ofinfomationprocessing･ Firmsareoftenassumedtobelocated
at some point on a continuum between the two extremes･ This
dependsontheextent towh土ch土nfomationisdisseminatedbytop
management or is allowed to rise from the lower levels of the
org.an土zation and thereby infom the decisionmaking processes･
However. a central theme of the this report ls the idea that
organizations do not only have to process information -- they
also have to create knowledge. This involves I-communities of
lnteraction一based onmembers from a diversity of locat土Ons in
the organization and can also span organizational boundaries･
The essence of 'Middle-up-Down-I (MUD) management is that no
particular section of the organization has exclusive
responsibilityforcreatingorganizationalknowledge･ Knowledge
can orlglnate from multiple sources within and outside the
organization. Zt is then the job ofmanagement to decide how
knowledge creationprocessesshouldbemanagedand exploited･
工n the MUD model, top management provides images of future
directionsforcorporatedevelopmentandthetime-scalebywhich
these "visions'have tobe realized. They areresponsible for
articulating the company'S "conceptualumbrella"which defines
a direction for unifying the companies different activities･
Company leadersarticulatethesevisionsinte川sofmetaphors,
symbolsand conceptsthat give direction toknowledge creating
process. Middle managers then translate these visions into
practicalprojects･ =notherwords,topmanagementexpressesthe
dream ofthe firm andmiddlemanagerslookat thereality･ The
topmanagementconceiveofwhatought tobewhilemiddlemanagers
are more concerned with the harsh details of what actually
exists･ =nsuchamodel,middlemanagersemergeasthekey link
inthechainbetweencurrentCapabilitiesandfutureasplrations.
Whilefuturevisionsaimtoprovideaunifyingtheme,theymight
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alsobeambiguousandopentoavarietyofalternativeandeven
conflicting interpretations･ This reflects the idea that a
vision which ls too sharply focussed becomes more akin to an
order or instruction. Zf middle managers are given SOme
opportunitytoshapetheconcept′theyarelikelytobecomemore
committed to the process of putting it into practice･ An
equivocalvisiongivesemployeesand selforganizingteamssome
degree of autonomy in setting their own goals. An important
pointhereisthat topmanagementfeelsabletotrustitsmiddle
managers･
At thelowerlevelsoftheorganization,frontlineemployeesand
junior managers are saturated by the details of technologies,
productsandmarkets. Nooneismoreexpertintherealitiesof
the companyrs business than they are. Yet, while they are
delugedwith information, they frequently find it difficult to
turnthatinformationintousefulknowledge･ Onsomeoccasions,
information can exhibit a bewildering quality which makes it
difficult tointerpretinameaningfulvay･ Forexample,signals
from the market can be vague or ambiguous･ AIso, front-line
employees can easily become so caught up in their own narrow
perspectives on the job in hand that they loose sight of the
broader context･ Even ifthey dodevelopmeaningfulideas,it
cansillbedifficult tocommunicatethevalueofthatknowledge
to others, S土nce much ofwhat they appreciate is likely to be
tacit and context specific･ The problem can be summarized
succinctlybyTSEliot'sspeculation ■-Whereistheknowledgewe
have lost in infomation?" Abstracting meaningful knowledge
from the infomation that overwhelms day一七〇一day business
activitiesthereforeemergesasachallengetomiddlemanagers.
Thus′inMUD,middlemanagershavetoprovidetheirsubordinates
withsomefom ofconceptualframeworkformakingsenseoftheir
own experience.
Knowledgecreationdoesnotsimplyrely oncharismaticmanagers
at the top ofthe org.anizat土on or on thedetailed knowledg.e of
front-lineemployees･ 工nsteaditextendsacrossandbeyond the
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Table1AComparisonofThreeMalagelleltModels
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companyand,inthisrespect,middlemanagersoccupy aposition
at the cross roadsbetween verticaland horizontal infomat土on
flows. Theybridgethegapbetweenvisionary idealsat thetop
of the organization and the front-line of business activity
conducted at lower levels in the hierarchy. Neither pure
romanticismnorundilutedrealism providecomprehensiverec⊥pes
forrunningacompany. Middlemanagershavetomediatebetween
the child-like innocence of grand visions and the hardened
cynicism of front-line employees whose dreams have long since
passed. Their function isanalogousto a knot that bindstop-
downandbottom-upmodels･ TheyaretheknowledgeengineersOf
theknowledgecreatingorganization. AcomparisonMUD.top-down
and bottom-upmanagement stylesisshown in Table l･
MUDmanagementandmoregeneralprinciplesofknowledgecreation
willnowbe illustratedby thethreecase-studiesthatcomprise
part 20fthereport･
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PART 2 CASE-Sm 工ESOFORGAN工ZAT工ONALRNOWLEDGECREAで工ON
2.1 CANON'sX工NエーCOP工ER
The main focus of this case-study is Canon's successful
developmentofitsMini-Copier,Whichprovidesagraphicexample
ofhow a company can create a newmarketby re-conceptualizing
an apparently mature product. At a time when the photocopler
marketwas saturated,Canon used a remarkableability to learn
frompastexperiences(derivedfromunsuccessfuldiversification
activities)toplotaanunerringcoursetowardsthedevelopment
ofaslg.nificantlycheaperproduct thatwouldbewithinthereach
ofamuch largerpopulation ofpotentialusers･ Thisinvolved
a completely fresh approach to photocopler design in order to
avoid the maintenance requirements that were associated with
establishedproductsand,at thesametime.producecopleSOfan
acceptable quality･ The study shows how a task-force can be
marshalled to bring a diversity of expertise to overcoming
technological bottlenecks in such a way that creativity is
combinedwithanacceptable levelofefficiency.
Canon'S experience illustrates how a sense of "crisis"can be
used constructively toconcentrateattentionontherealization
ofvisions for futuredevelopment. The task oftopmanagement
is to translate these visions into reality by communicating
attainabletargetstoemployees. =nthecaseoftheMini-copier,
thecrisisinducedby saturation土nthetrad土tlonalphotocopler
marketwasusedto focustheeffo工.tSOfalar°.e Htask-force"to
overcometheproblemsofproducing.anew typeofcopler･ Under
thisuJnbrella, the I.horizontallTdiversity ofthought, which is
frequently a criticalelement in creativeproblem solvingt was
balanced with the need to concentrateon the "vertical"target
ofprogresstowardstheproductperformancespeciflcat土Onsthat
wouldhavetobemetiftheproductweretostand any chanceof
being commercially successful･ Zn this respectl the study
emphasi2:eStheimportanceof "requisitevariety",togetherwith
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the importance of an lnterdlsciplinary but integrated
technologicalknowledgebase.
Background
Canon was founded in 1938 and.for more than twenty years,
concentrated on being a specialist in camera and optical
technologleS･ Thefirstattempt toextendthiswell-established
technological knowledge base came in 1959,when development
started on the -lSynchro-reader' or 'fvoice mail".which was a
machine for encoding spoken messages on magnetic cards which
couldbesentinthemail･ ThereciPlentcouldthenusethecard
to reproduce the spoken messag■e. However′ the quality of
reproducti_On represented a poor substitute for a telephone
conversat土On and the product was a spectacular failure.
Nevertheless, itdid serve to challenge the established status
可uowithinthecompanyandfocusattentiononthepossibilityof
doingthingsinanew anddifferentway･ Thiswasreflected in
asecondattemptatd土versif⊥cat土on,whichcamein1964withthe
launchofthe'Canola130-I-- afasteasy-to-usecalculator,that
enabled Canon to capture a growing share of the calculator
market.
By 1970.calculators had become the second mainstay ofCanon′s
business portfolio, accounting for 40 per cent of sales･
However, the success story was interrupted inAugust 1972when
the calculatormarket was turned on its head by the launch of
Casio′s 7-Mini' Pointed the way towards a growing demand for
compact,personalcalculatorsselling for lessthan 10,000yen.
工nitially Canon equivocated about following.this trend towards
'popularizing'thetechnology--believingthatitsexpertiselay
with higher quality products一一but ,under pressure from the
salesdepartment 一一whowere desperate to a product that could
compete with Casio′ Canon developed the HPanther一 personal
calculator as an emergency measure. Canon entered the market
morethanayear-and-halfaftertheircompetitorsandi∬皿ed⊥ately
facedanuphillbattle. 工nthefirst土nstance,CasiohadamaコOr
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advantageintheformofanestablisheddistributionnetworkvia
stationery store outlets 一一 whereas Canon had to start from
scratch. ThedecisiveblowforCanoncamewhenitwasdiscovered
that the pioneering use of light emitting diodes (LEDs) had
causedreliabilityproblems･ TheLEDsrwhichwereimportedfrom
aUScompanyweresensitivetoheatandfrequentlyfailedduring
Japan's hot suJTLmermonths. These difficultieswere compounded
bydifficulttradingconditionsarisingfrom theeffectsofthe
1973 0土1 price 土ncreases and′by June 1975,the company was
unable topay the shareholdersadividend･
Althoughthecalculatorgroupsubsequentlycarriedontodevelop
successful word-processors and type wr土ters 一一 helped by the
distribution channelsto stat土one工･y StOreS一一inthemid-1970S.
thecompanyhadtoconfrontalevelofcr⊥sisthatthエーeatened土ts
very survival. Toaddressthisproblemthepresidentattempted
to re-establish his employees self-confidence by offering the
challenging Vision of transforming Canon into a 'Premier
Company". The ideawas to give People aworthwhilegoal --0r
rallying point -- that would provide a means to overcome the
prevailingdifficulties. ThisPremierCompanyPlanwasscheduled
to run over two successive th工･ee-yea工.pe工･土ods 一一 in the first
instance focusing on Japan and subsequently on a more global
markets. The realization of premier company statuswas to be
achievedthroughrigorousattentiontoperformance,quality and
thebuildingofsalesnetworks. Thisincludedthereorganization
ofthecompany intoproductgroups,directingattentiontowards
the more effective use of personnel′土ncreased automation and
more generalmeasurestobuild the corporate image.
The Canon Production System initiativewas launched in 1976as
a drive towards greater efficiency in which employees were
encouraged to reflect on their job functions and consider the
potential for improved performance･ This was done on a
cooperativebasisandeffortsweremade to thetypeofcoercion
thatbreedsresentmentand theexcessivepursuitofpersonalas
opposedtocorporateobjectives･ During1978,theorganizational
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Structure of the company was developed 土nto a HmatrixH style
organization which reflected the evolution of 'cornmunities of
practice'- that had been taking- place over several years.
Horizontal structures responsible for research and development
produce ideas and proposals that a工.e appropriate to a cross-
Sectionofproductgroupswhichhavetheaim ofmakingprofits･
The technological knowledge base represents related ares of
expertise and ismanages to promote synerglC linkages between
overlapping areas. A ‖dynamic harmony-1between research and
product-development functions is promoted by regular meetings
between the chiefsofbothdimensionso王 thematrix.
Canon'sresearchbaseissupportedbybodiesconductingresearch
according to different time horizons for exploitation ranging
from near一market development to the work of the Advanced
Technology center which engages in research directed towards
appHcat土onsbetweenfiveandtenyears土nthefuture･ Compared
to other companies operating in similar fields of technology,
Canonhassignificantnumbersofemployeesfromarelativelywide
range of backgrounds - mechanical and electrical engineers
accountfor30percentofthe total;Chemicalengineersmakeup
another 17per cent; 10per cent are tra土ned 土n physics,while
a similarproportionhavebackgroundsin computertechnology･
Canon'squesttobecomeapremiercompany ledtoitplacingmore
emphasis on photocop⊥ers and business machines than had
previouslybeen thecase. By 1990,businessmachinesaccounted
for three-quarters of Canon′s sales. In 1991′ total saユes
exceeded 1trillion yen′ reflect⊥ng.the accumulated effects of
anaveragegrowthrateof 14percentoverthepreviousdecade･
Net profit in that year was 76 bill土on yen and followed five
successiveyearsofgrowth･ Ztwasagainstthebackgroundofthe
success ofCanon's attempt to acquire '-premier company' Status
thatthe companyachieved itsresounding successwithitsMini-
Copler.
Xini-copier
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Canon'S established knowledge base in camera and optical
technology provided technological linkagesthat proved to be a
key factor in enabling it to diversify into the photocopler
market. Despitesomeinternalopposit土on′thecompanyin土t土ated
a project to develop a plain paper copler 土n 1962･ Six years
later. itwasable to introduceaproduct thatdid notviolate
anyofXerox'S600pluspatents･ ThisremarkableachievementWas
helped by strong linkages and cornmonalities with their
establishedexpertise in cameraandopticaltechnologleS･
By the late-1970S, the demand forplainpapercop⊥ers levelled
of as the market became saturated. Rather than admit defeat
Canon set about re-conceptualizing the photocopler in terms of
a cheaper and more reliable product that could be used by a
larger population of users without incurring prohibitive
maintenance costs. Nev users,such as small businesses and
perhaps even households′would then extend the copler market･
Naturally the new copier Should be capable ofproducing clear
copies. Inaddition, itwasfelt that itshouldbe lightweight
(less than 50 pounds) and compact, requiring only extremely
simplemaintenanceornoneatall･ Moreover,theinitialprice
shouldbeequivalent toapproximatelyS1.000dolla工■S･ Asafirst
step′afeasibilitystudyteamwasfomedtoexaminetheproblems
that would be encountered in realizing the concept of a Mini-
copler. A 14memberteamwasformedwhichhadanaverageageof
28and compr土sed 8members from R&D.3from product土on′2from
marketingand ifrom productdesign.
ThecentralprobleminproducingaMini-copierWasresolvingthe
conflict between low cost and high reliab土1土ty. Reliability
analysis of existing copiers revealed that 90 per cent of
problemsinvolvedthedrum. Brainstormingsessionswereheldon
how toimprovetherel土ab土1ityofthedrum･ Towardstheend of
onesuchsession,theleadersentoutforsomecansofbeerwhich
werethenconsumed･ At thispoint.d土scuss土onturnedto thecost
of disposable beer cans and,by analogy,the possibility of
developing disposable photocopler drums･ This stimulated a
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livelydiscussionandprompted theconceptuallzationofafresh
approachtobasicphotocoplerdesignbasedonpackagingthedrum
and surrounding components in a disposable cartridge. By
bringing everything together in the drum,the whole structure
couldbe simplifiedallowingbothcostsavingsandimprovements
torel土ab⊥1ity.
工twasclear from theoutsetthat thecom erc土aldevelopmentof
the Mini-copier Would require talents from across the whole
company･ In consequence,atask-forcewasassembled comprising
some 300membersselectedby thepresident. W土ththeexception
oftheenomouslysuccessfulAE-1cameradevelopment土nit土ative-
- this task force was the largest ever formed at Canon. =ts
sloganbecamethe "developmentoftheAE-icopier",Whichwasa
powerfulrallying callthatevoked imagesofpast success.
The projected use pattern for the copier Was Such that the
reliability achieved by television sets was selected as an
appropriate target. A CostGroupwithin thetask-force sought
to ensure that the product was englneered to meet the target
selling price･ New design technologies Were developed to
facilitateminiaturization,reduceweightandautomateassembly
procedures･ The assembly line featured automated inspection
machineryandprocesstechnologydesigned incollaborationwith
supply companies and the knowledge base so formed was
subsequently exploited 土n otherofficeautomation products.
The Mini-copier Was launched in 1982 and by 1987 had been
instrumental in increasing Canon's share of the total copier
market t0 35percent,Comparedt024percentin 1979. Between
1976 and 1983, the company's sales grew by a factor of 6.9
representingthehighestrateamongJapanesecompaniesinthetop
500Companieslisted by Fortunemagazine･
Conclusion
Canon′sMini-copierinvolvedamove into anewareawherethere
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were no teachers and, 土n consequence. limited scope to use
authority as a legitimate mechanism for suppressing free
discussion. Recogni･zing this fact and using a task force to
coordinate a company-wide diversity of perspectives on the
technicalbottlenecksassociatedwithMini-copler'sdevelopment･
Zn addition to bringing together perspectives from adiversity
ofbackgrounds, there isalso a need toincorporatevariety in
the 'fmentalapproach"ofdifferentmemberstosolvingproblems.
For example, some individuals are biased towards active
exper土mentat土on.whileothersaremOre土ncl土nedtodrawinsights
from observationsand passive reflectionon the resultsofthe
enquiry･ Naturally both sets of sk土1ls are needed -
experimentationgeneratesnewexperience,whichiscomplemented
bythereflect土Onthatpavesawaytowardsthe fomat土onofnew
concepts･
Canon'sMini-copiertaskforcebrought threwpeopletogetherwho
then had towork asa selforganizingteam. A importantpoint
here isthat the selforganizing team wasnota self-selecting
team･ Left to theirown devices, seniordevelopment engineers
would tempted to select team members that reflected their own
research profiles 一 一 whethe･i-Y. "experimentation oriented-' or
whatever -- thereby undermining the principle ofdiversity and
reducing thepotentialfor creativity.
Thediversityoftheselforganizingteamcreatesanenvironment
foraskingbasicquestionsthat -Texperts'in aparticularfield
might not consider ･ Zn addition to tacitunderstanding, there
is also what might be called f.tacit misunderstanding'fwhere
individualsbelievetheyaresharingacommonbodyofknowledge
butin facthaveinconsistentimpressionsoftheproblemsbeing
addressed. The involvement of individuals from different
backgroundscanleadtoasimplerdialogueinwhichunderstanding
that might nomally be shared on a tacit basis has to be
externalized.
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2.2 N工SSAN′sREV工TAL工ZAT工ON
工ntroduction
Thepresentcase-studyofNissan,whichisJapan'ssecondlargest
automobilemakerafterToyota,illustrateshowtheuseof"future
visionsI'were used by the president to tackle what might be
calledthe'bigcompanydisease"associatedwiththeconsequences
ofabureaucracycharacterizedbyrigiddepartmentalbarriersand
a lack ofcreativity onthepartoftheemployees･ Lnitiatives
wereintroducedtopromotetheconstructiveexchangeofopinions
and the opportunity to create new knowledge by reflecting on a
diversity ofviewpoints. Positive feedbackarising from anew-
foundconfidenceintheabilityofemployeestoproposedifferent
ways ofdoing thingsaccelerated themomentum of changewithin
thecompany･ Theprevailingorganizationalculturecapturedthis
change as employees became more customer-oriented in their
attempts topromotethe companiesimage･
HoweverE Creativity is no guarantee of competitiveness¢
Sustainedincreasesinmarketsharerelyonproducts thatembody
acombinationo王priceandpe工.fomancecharacter土Stlcswhlch 土s
appropriatetoprevailinguserrequirements･ Sustainedincreases
in market share rely on products that embody a combination of
price and performance characteristics that are appropriate to
prevailing user requirements. In Nissan's case,Signs Of an
improvedcompetitiveedgeinitsdomesticmarket,whichfollowed
fromarticulatingcreativityintermsofnewproductdesigns,Was
underminedwhen theJapanese 一bubbleeconomy-Iofthelate-1980s
finallyburstin 1991. pr土or to thiscollapse,buoyant trading
conditions had encouraged Japanese auto-makers to place some
considerable emphasison product d土fferentlation asameans to
capture a larger market share. Yet, when trading conditions
becamediff土cult′pricecompetitionbecamemoreslg■nif土cantand
theindustryleader,Toyota,whosemottois'.goodautomobilesat
a reasonable price'had a much larger sales infrastructure and
economies of scale to switch back to this fom of competition
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withrelativeease. By contrast,Nissanwasnot sowellplaced
toadaptand inMarch 1993wentinto thered forthefirst time
sinceaperiodofextremeturbulencejustaftertheSecondWorld
War.
ChangingtheCultureatNissan
光anyoftheseedsofNissan'Screativitycrisiscanbetracedto
thepe工●iodbetween1975and1985･ At that time′thecompanywas
concentratingontherapidexpansionofoverseasoperationsand
was less attentive to pエーOblems back 土n Japan where its
organizationalstructurehaddevelopedintoarigidbureaucracy
that stifled flexibility and creativity. 工t was an era when
sheerSalesvolumeWasbelievedtobethekeytoprofltabil⊥ty.
Product designs reflected a great deal of compromise between
different sectional interests within the company･ When the
designteamsOfferedalternativeproposalsfornewmodelstothe
Presidentforapproval,thereWasageneralbeliefin "safetyin
silence"･ Designersworriedaboutwhatmiddlemanagerswouldsay
and middle managerswere anxious about the thoughts of senior
management. No judgement was made until options had been
assessedbythePresident. Designsforcarsorlglnallytargeted
atyoungdriversWeremodified to takeaccountof the opinions
ofseniorexecutiveswhomightbeover60yearsold. Theoverall
image of the company'S products tended became dull and out of
touchwiththeevolutionofcustomerr.equirements.
Discord and confrontation between topmanagement and the union
mademattersworse･ Managementcouldnot transferemployeesor
bring in new production equlpment Without the union's consent.
Pressure to conform with the union'S position discouraged
employees from expressing their om opinions. Without the
transferofindividualsbetweendepartments.employeestendedto
becomeinwardlookingwithaloyaltytothegroupratherthanthe
company as a whole･ Change was resisted because it seen as a
sourceofnewproblemsforthedepartmentspreservingestablished
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procedureswaseasier.
LaborrelationsdominatedthePresident'S timeandmanagementwas
restructured to try and promote c011aborat土on between middle
managers and shop floor supervisors. A new Labor Management
department was established i.n 1984 but 土t was not until the
powerfulhead ofthe automobileworkers union resigned in 1986
that things started to settle down. Zn the meantime,
Run ewaspromotedtoPresidentinJune1985. 0nthebasis
pastexperiencehehaddiagnosedthat thedesignProcess
theheartofNissan'Sproblemsand sought tocontinuehis
against stagnation and inflexibility. fliswasapproach
articulateanew corporatevisionwiththephrase "1et′s
the flow"meaning "let's stir up the statusquo and get
moving inadifferentdirectionH.
Yutaka
ofhis
wasat
fight
was to
change
things
CreatinganAtmosphere forFree Dialogue
PresidentKumefelt thatseniormanagementatNissanwereoverly
conscious ofstatus attached to d土ffe工■ent pOS土tionswithin the
company･ Hewantedtopromotedialogueandwheneverhehad the
chancewalkedaroundthecompanyproclaiming "let'snotrespect
harmony too much-1, "having controversy at every level of the
organizationisproofofitshealth'■ and "there'stoomuchKeigo
[ie the very polite form of Japanese used to show respect】 at
Nissan'. He feltthat iftheemployeesweretohavea senseof
unity and become oriented towards customer needs, there was a
need todispensewith 'fmeaninglessformalities.I.
Kumebelievedthatnewwaysofthinkingaredrivenbydiversity
and targeted the role played by middle management as a key
instrument for rejuvenating the organization. A weekly
newsletter was established as a forum for middle manag■ers to
express positive proposals for change. Other newsletters
followed toprovideameansforemployeesingeneraltoexpress
theiropinions. At theorganizationallevel,acompletelyfresh
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approach was taken to product development,While Personnel
Managementwasrestructured.
工皿plementinganew culture;the "Be-1●tproject
Thecase ofNissan'sBe-iCar isa striking exampleofhow the
principlesofKume'Svisionofcreativeproductdevelopmentand
waslaunched土n 1984whenheHeado至R&D. Whereaspastprac七五ce
hadlimitedtheroleofthedesigndepartment toprovidingimages
ofconceptsalreadydevelopedbytheproductdevelopmentsect土ong
the Be-iwasto bea design-driven projeCt･ The intentionwas
to provide scope for free thinking and a fresh approach･ A
designteamWasformedanddividedintothreegroups･ Whileteam
AworkedinaccordancewithNissan'straditionalprocedures,the
Bteamworkedincollaborationwithindependentappareldesigners
andteam C cornmissioned adesign from an Italian company･
The B team teamsapproachwasmost radicalin that the company
had no tradition of collaboratingwithoutsiders from thevery
conception of a project. Working with fashion designers Who
tended to put a relatively low priority on functional土ty was
something ofa culture shock for Nissan'sdeslgnerS･ The team
toured fashionable areas of Tokyo to look at the imagery
associated with leading retailers and attended lectures on
fashiontrends･ Graduallytheirnewwayofthinkingledthemto
seekaproduct thatembodied 一warmth'fand 'fanabilitytorecover
humanvaluesfrom hightechnologyl'.
Subsequently all three teams submitted clay model of their
prototypesto evaluation by apanelof 160employeeschosen at
random exceptforanagebiastowardsyoungermembersofstaff.
TheB teamsmodelemerged asa clear favorite and developed as
a "concept car"intended only to show the latestdesign trends
at Nissan･ Nevertheless,the company subsequently changed its
mind following an extremely favorably reaction to a prototype
exhibitedatthe 1985Tokyo班OtorShowandpersistentenquiries
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about the market introduction date from potential customers.
Notwithstanding the four year development time normally
associated with a new model it was decided to set a target of
small scale production within one year･ A niche market was
identifiedbasedonaproductwithafairdegreeofcustomization
(Coveringdetailssuchastheroofandtransmission)withasales
target of 10-000units in twoyears･
A 3 tho u gi^i '止 edeveiop汀岳entaCtuai1号J.Itookor!e-and-halfyearsfthis
好己S St il l st)望Cta.C･L?.上蓋ごエⅤ 工員Stも <ed:bile part of this achievement
colユニd b e e>こP⊥ained by t3-1e eXteTISive use 〇f components frori
anotherrtiOdeユダ盈furtheごfactc5r iT3theequationwas abreakwith
pastdeveiopmeritPrOCeduresへ For TLhefirst time,Nissanmadeuse
ofcross functionalteams tc,brin冒 tOgethermembersfromallover
the companTJYland ever三affiユiateLrJ_Companies to work on deslgnT
testtproduction, purchaselsaieSFadvertisinganddistribution'
Productionwasbasedatanaffiliatedcompanyandwasmainlyby
hand reflecting the need for flexibility in the customization
process甘 Thus i t appeared that KumeFsvision of "changing the
floW'■haC?been effe｡tive irlestablishing 三 neW Way Of doing
thingsat王1iSSarB. A ipurthe二eXamPieof thisvisionwasprovide(≡
bv thecasemanagersinvolvedinengineresearchanddevelopment
at the companypsplant in Tsurumi.
'lTheLively TsuruniCompany-f
ZnMarch 1976,actionwas taken to -'stir up"thel′500employees
at thecompaniesresearch facility inthe townofTsurumi･ This
initiative,knownas the I-TheLivelyTsurumiCompany■f(whichwas
a reference to a company depicted 土n a popular televis土On
program)aimed tochallengeoldvaluesandgiveyoungemployees
achancetofeelconfidentaboutexpressingtheiroplnions･ All
the act土Ⅴ土t土es were voluntary and conducted outside official
working hours･ At heart young people are dying to express
themselves and can often provide valuable opln土ons 土f the an
atmosphereiscreatedwhere theyfeelfree toexpressthemselves
and offer alternative opinions about company organization and
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procedures.
PuttingtheCustomersFirst
工nDecember 1986.0ntheoccasionofnissan′S53rdanniversary′
President Xume proposed that meaningful steps should be taken
towards becoming customer-oriented･ Customers should be
conceptualizedinabroadsenseaspeopleallovertheWorldthat
couldbeservedbyNissan'sproducts･ Providingthesecustomers
and potentialcustomerswith good service required thatNissan
should pull together as an integrated team characterized by
synerglCinteractionbetweenmembers･
AProductHeadquartersschemewasinitiatedtointegrateproduct
development. manufacturing.and sales･ Prev土ously, different
departments had acted with less than appropriate regard to
realizing the orlglnalv⊥S土on behind new product developments･
for example. the designer Of the I-Skyline"model had a vivid
image of a flash of lightening striking a Japanese cedar tree
standingaloneonaplain. Yetthemarketingcopydidnotcome
up with anything more inspiring than "the Skyline is urban
englneering1..
RestructuringPersonnelXanagement
Animportantdimensionofthepromotionoffluidcommunications
took the fom of careful attention to the 土mplementation of
policies for rotation between job functions, Changlng the
criteriaforemployeeevaluationandintroducingnewpoliciesfor
recruitment. To introduce rotation between departments,Xume
challenged the validity of traditional attitudes that prized
-.thoroughbred functions-■and instead placed emphasis on job
rotationbetweenfunctions. Thispolicyledtoaproductmanager
beingchosen from salesasopposedtoR&Dwhichhadalwaysbeen
the case in the past･ Significant numbers of people were
- 44-
transferredtootherdepartments,whileitbecamearulethatno
onecouldbepromotedtothepositionofdirectorunlesstheyhad
served in at least two functionalareas.
In order to encourage younger employees,Changesweremade the
systemforevaluatingpersonnel･ Insteadofpersonnelevaluation
being undertaken by the individua1's immediate supervisor,
assessmentsfromcolleaguesandsubordinateswerealsotakeninto
account･ Theopinionofsuperiormanagersin otherdepartments
couldalsobetakenintoaccount,ifthecandidaterequeststhat
thistakeplace.
Anew paymentsystemwasintroducedwhich stressedperformance-
basedpayandgreatlyreducedtheimportanceofseniority･ This
new system attempted to encourage more competition between
employees and thereby ⊥ncrease the chance that more able
individuals will rise to the point where their abilities are
realized.
Conclusions
lnitiativessuchas "changingthe flow"′promotingyoungtalent
as a source of creative thinking and becoming more customer-
oriented show how a stagnantcompany canberegenerated. While
Nissan's subsequent down-turn in fortunes suggests that
organizational creativity is not sufficient to protect the
companyfromashlft土ntradingconditions.⊥tislikelythatthe
company Would be more vulnerable to these challenging market
conditions if it had retained a fragmented internal structure･
Communication isa key element in building flexibility and the
overlap of understanding,based on common experience gained
through job rotation and so on, is an important factor in
building■aroute towardsmoreefficientproduction･
Whileareturntoprice-basedcompetitioninadepressedtrading
conditionshasreducedtheextent towhichcreativedesignsCan
- 45-
secureanincreasedshareofthemarket,theimprovedabilityof
Nissan to act as an integrated organization remains as an
importantachievement. Inarecent土ntervlew.thenewpresident
wasaskedtoexplainNissan'sreducedmarketshareandresponded
by drawing attention to Nissan's relative lack of sales power
compared to that ofToyota. Hewent on to note that the cycle
associatedwithmodelchang.estookapproximately fouryearsand
that, in common with other companies, Nissan capitali2:ed in
increased salesduringthe firstyearafterthe introductionof
anewmodelbut failedtomatch the competitionwhen itcame to
sustainingthat interestin subsequentyears. Nissan lacksthe
salesinfrastructurethat土sneededtopush土tsproductsforward
inthe face ofthe compet土t土on･
ThecaseofNissan servestounderlinetheideathatcreativity
can be generated but at a cost･ rn changing market
circumstances, new problems can emerge that might have
significant implications for the agenda ofknowledge creation･
Zt is therefore important that the organization devotes
sufficient attention to these "Windows'f (or interfaces)with
emergingdifficulties.
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2_3 THE FIFTH GENERATION COHPUTER SYSTEHS PROJECT= RESEARCH
HAm GEXENTATTHECENTRAL RESEARCHFAC工L王TY
工ntroduction
This case study is concerned with research management at the
FifthGenerationComputerProコeCt′scentralresearchfacility一一
known as ZCOT. The project began in 1982 and was initially
scheduledtorunfor10years,butwassubsequentlyextendedfor
afurthertwoyears. whereasearliergenerationsofcomputerhad
been characterized by their component technologies (valves,
transistors,integratedcircuitsandvery-large-scale-integration
or -1VLSI-'),fifth generation computing was conceptualized in
termsofwhat thecomputerwouldbeabletodo･ Itwasexpected
that f土fth generation computers would be able exhibit
"intelligentqualities"thatwouldmakeitpossibletounderstand
spoken instructions,emulate human reasoning and explain how
conclusions are reached (Anchordoguy 1989; Feigenbaum and
McCorduck 1985and;Unger 1987)･
The project involved a totalof eight firms that allowed young
researcherstoworkat thecentralresearchfacility. Giventhe
traditionoflifetimeemploymentwiththe sameorganizationthe
idea of sending employees off to collaborate with members of
rival firms is somewhat against the grain ofbusinesspractice
inJapanandwasonlytoleratedby thecompaniesbecauseofthe
basicnatureoftheresearch. =n consequence,building =COTas
f-an organization between organizations一 was something of a
challengeinthat itinvolvedalltheproblemsoforchestrating
a task force but did not have the advantag■e of being able to
appealtonotionsofloyalty to 'the company一･
Background
Government-sponsoredcooperativeresearch initiativesorganized
by theHinistryofInternationalTradeand Industry (MZTZ)have
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oftenbeencitedasan importantfactorin supportingtherapid
development of Japan′s competitive position in computer and
semiconductorcomponenttechnologies. Thesemaybetracedfrom
theearly 1960sand,Ove工■a20-yearperiod,were土nstrumentalin
Japanese firm s to close the gap with best-practice Western
technology. TheapparentsuccessoftheseschemespromptedMZTZ
tocontemplatearatherdifferent typeofcollaborativeresearch
venture that, far from aiming to catch up with existing
technology,would lead the world into a new era of so called
"fifth generation'lcomputing･ The announcementof the project
in, 1981. Sent shock waves reverberating around the world
infomat土On industry and prompted many competitor countries to
adoptcountermeasures.
Much of the West'S concern relating to the Fifth Generation
Computer project stemmed from the apparent success of MIT='s
l976180VLSZproject,whichwaswidelyacclaimedasbeingamajor
factor in enabling Japanese integrated circuitmakerstomatch
best-practiceUStechnology. TheVLSZprojectWasanear-market
catch-upinitiative,which involvedasufficiently largeamount
ofmoney to ensure thatnon-particlpationwould place the f土rm
concerned at a serious disadvantage relative to participating
firms･ Although therewasa centralresearch facility for the
sharedcreationofknowledgethiswasmainlyconcernedwithmore
basicresearchrtheprojeCt'smorecommercially-orientedworkwas
organized on a lTmodularbasisl'--enabling the firmsto absorb
the results of the government-fun°ed resea工･Ch without
compromisingtheircompetitiveposition. Itcouldbearguedthat
rather than being collaborative research′ theproコeCtWasmore
ofa "balancedsubsidy'-toassistapplied,Cornmerciallyoriented
development.
The Fifth Generation Computer Systems project Was in complete
contrast to the preceding VLSZproコeCt and, as iswell knom ,
reactiontotheresultsannouncedataninternationalconference
heldinTokyoin 1992 (tenyearsaftertheprojectwaslaunched)
was mixed･ During the life of the project, Progress in
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alternative technologleS aS Well as rapid advances in
conventionalcomputertechnologyovershadowedtheachievements.
Whiletheultimatevalueoftheresultsofatechnology thatis
still in the basic stages of its development are difficult to
predict,ithascontributed to thepersonalknowledgebaseheld
by anumberofyoung.researchers.
ArticulatingaResearch I.Vision'landBuildinganEnvironmentfor
RnovledgeCreation
The articulation of a corLmOn "visionHat ICOTwas strengthened
by the fact that its leader, Dr Fuch土′ wasable to bring.three
ofhis colleagues from MITZ's ElectrochemicalLaboratory (ETL)
totheproject.Initiallytherewerethreelabswithin ICOT,two
ofwhichwereledbyFuchi'scolleaguesfromETL. Fuchi'sthird
colleague, whowasmore junior, became an assistant laboratory
chiefandwassubsequentlypromoted to laboratorychieftowards
themiddleoftheproコeCtWhenthenumberoflabswasincreased
to five. =ndividuals that shared a common vision of ZCOT's
objectivesthereforeemergedinkeypos土t土onswithintheproject.
The core of ICOT's knowledge creation process centered on a
com onresearchenv土ronment土nthe fom ofonesingle room. 工n
1985. thisroom contained some50researchersandbytheendof
1989 there were about 100 researchers. While the com on room
went some considerableway towards promoting daily interaction
between the researchers,the processwas further stimulated by
regular changes in layout to bring particulargroups thatwere
working■onrelatedareas⊥ntocloserphysicalproximitywitheach
other･ Consciouseffortsweremadetodeveloparrangements that
wouldsupportevolvingknowledgenetworksandinformationflows.
Thecommonroompromotedthetransferoftacitknowledgethrough
socialization and this effect was further strengthened by the
fact that the researchers also shared the same living
accommodation･ ZCOT trips featuring shared sporting and
recreation time represent a furtherdimension of the not土On of
a shared environment and enhance the scope to share tacit
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knowledgeandunderstanding･ Bypromotingsocialization itwas
felt that,evenifaresearcherwasonlyaverage,theywouldhave
a chance to contribute their full potential to the overall
effort.
There were various patterns by which researchers came to ZCOT
from the participating companies･ One route followed from a
feelingamongst ZCOT'sleader'sthat theresearchwouldbenefit
fromthepart土clpationofaparticularindividual,inwhichcase
the company was approached with a request to allocate that
researcher to the project. The nomalperiod with the project
wasaboutthreeyears,althoughtherewereinstanceswhere ZCOT
indicated to thecompany that theywould liketheresearcherto
stay a little longer･
Anotherpattern for joiningtheprojectoccurred in caseswhere
individualswho had just completed their doctoratesapproached
=COTbecauseoftheinterestingnatureofitswork. while ZCOT
was a fixed-ten proコeCt thatwasnot 土n a position to recruit
staff 一一 in about ten cases - 土t was possible to introduce
promising individuals to a participating company･ These
researcherswerethenhiredbythecompanyandallocatedtoICOT･
Theyworkedcontinuallywiththeprojectandeventuallyquallf土ed
as sub-leadersand during the latter part ofthe project, when
the number of laboratorieswas increased′ were promoted to the
position of laboratory leader.
The basic nature of ICOT'swork lent itself to the possibility
of particlpating-fully 土n various 工.eSearCh networks without
compromising the competitive positions of the participating
companies･ ZCOTestablishedavarietyofcortmitteesandworking
groupscoveringuniversitiesandotherresearchorganizationsin
Japan･ 工t also formed 土nternational links and a system was
established for forming links with overseas organizations by
inviting visiting researchers from these institutions to spend
time at tCOT･ TypiCally these researchers might come for an
initialperiod ofabout threeweeksand′ ifmembersofthe lab
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inquestionagree,promisingindividualsmightbeinvitedtostay
fora longerperiod.
Implications forOrg■anizationalRnovledg■e Creation
ZnJapan, =COTprovidesarareexampleofan "Organizationbuilt
between organizations7-. Zts temporary existence and the
diversity ofbackground and organizational affiliations of its
membersmeantthattheneedtobuildanenvironmentforeffective
socializationattheearliestpossibleopportunitywasofcrucial
importance･ Arguably, thepromotionofeffectivesocialization
hinged on the ability of Fuchi to articulate a vision for the
work and shared working and living environment that was
constructed fortheyoung researchers.
ZCOT'Semphasisonbasicresearchplacedaveryhighpremium on
the need to externalize conceptualthought processes that were
located at the forefront of intellectual activity in the
discipline. In consequence′soc土alization can be seen as an
especiallycriticalmodeofconversionintheknowledgecreating
process. Oncetheform土dablebarrierofeffectivesoc土alizatlon
hasbeenovercome, othermodesofknowledgeconversioncanfollow
with relative ease.
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PART 3 CONCLUD工NG COHXENTS
This report has outlined the principles of a dynamicmodel of
organizationalknowledgecreation. Themodelattemptstocombine
notions of developments inside the organization with parallel
developmentsintheexternaloperating.envlronment･ 工t stresses
that organizationsare organic entitiesthathave awide range
and d土vers土ty of interfaces with the outside world･ 工ntra一
OrganizationalknowledgecreationinvolvesHepistemologlCal"and
'ontological"dimensionsthatspanorganizationalboundaries･
DifferencesbetweenJapaneseandWesternOrganizations
Japanese companiesremain an enigma tOmany Western observers･
They are not in any obviousway especially efficient, nor are
they outstandingly entrepreneurial･ Management strategies are
generally grounded in accumulated experience rather than
fashionablebusinessschooltheoriesandyet.slowlybutsurely,
theJapanese corporationhasbecomeanincreasinglymorestrong
force ln the 土nternationalmarketplace･
For half a century,Japanese companies have operated in an
environment where the only certainty Was uncertainty. The
effectsoftheSecondWorldWarleft theeconomyinruinsandthe
reconstructionhasbeenshapedbytwowarslnKoreaandV土etnam.
two "OilShocksl, fluctuating exchange ratesand the collapse
of the l'bubble economy"ofthe late-1980S. Asa late-comer to
internationalcompet土tionJJapanwascontinually facedwiththe
problem of chasing a moving target as the frontier of best-
practice technology moved forward･ This induced patterns of
continuousinnovationwhich.inacumulativesense,standoutas
maコOrachievements.
Japan'straditionoflife-timeemploymentengendersconsiderable
loyalty to the company and a relatively high degree of
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willingness to support measures that will promote the
organizationasawhole. Thisincludesaconsiderablecommitment
to the company in ten s of hours spent atwork, With overtime
being a way of life for many salaried workers. Socialization
overa longworkingday isoneofthe factorsthatpromotesthe
development of -'redundant knowledgeHwhich contributes to the
effectiveness of the knowledge creation process. However, it
costly,in ten softheinputofhuman エーeSOurCeS, and servesto
underlinetheconsiderable sizeofthepremium thatisrequired
to implement 'TJapanese style"knowledgecreation.
Life-longcommitmentstoaparticularorganizationmeansthatnew
technologyisnotseensomuchasthreat toemploymentbutrather
an opportunity to improve the corporate position. Robots and
automation generally enjoy a POSitive image in Japan which
contrasts sharply with Western concerns about their employment
impllcations･ For male employees′employment with a ma]or
Japanese corporation is a life-long investment･ As such,
pa工■t土C⊥pat土on in voluntary activities (such as N土ssan's IJively
Tsurumi Company') are simply one way of supporting that
investment. Long hours, followed by after-Work leisure time
spent with colleagues, further builds an environment where
apparently-redundantknowledgecanbeshared- therebybuilding
aknowledgeinfra-Structurethatcanbedeployedon some future
occaslOn･ Company trips and holidays spent with colleagues
represent a fu工ther dimension to this process of -■extended
socialization'.
The social network that overlays Japanese company culture
providesconsiderableopportunitiesforbuildingtacitknowledge
and internalizing viewpoints expressed by colleagues. For
example,inJapanface-to-facemeetingsaregenerallyconsidered
tobepreferableto thepopularWesterapproachof"communication
by memo一･ Western firms usually place a high value on the
externalization of knowledge which can then be combined with
other explicit knowledge･ Thus, as was noted earlier, the
Westernsystemcanbeanalogoustoarelayraceinwhicha ■lbaton
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of infomation-■is passed amongst members of the com unity of
interaction. Face to face dialogue -- the essence of
"collaboratingwiththepresent一一 1 -isthen subordinated tothe
sequentialaccessing.of ■-packetsof土nformation"thathavebeen
passed on from some point in the past･ This places greater
emphasisontheuseoflanguageandimagestorecordthepast--
whichindeedmightbeinvaluablewhenitcomestoavoiding "tacit
misunderstandings" but it is achieved at a cost removing the
qualityof"instantfeedback■'wh土chisassociatedwithreal-time
dialogue. Thus, the high performance associated with high-
spec土fication western style documentation is countered the
greaterflexibility thatcanbedisplayedbytheJapanesesystem
when it comes to responding to current needs and engineering
incremental improvements to quality･ Both systems also have
distinctive shortcomings. Western concerns with explicit
information can lead to "paralysis" ar'is土ng. from too much
unintelligibledetail,whileJapanese-stylesocializationcanend
in "group thinkH･
SuccessfulJapanesecompanieshaveusedtheprinciplesofproコeCt
task-forcesandthedevelopmentofstructuresto facll土tatethe
developmentofinter-Organizationalknowledgenetworksthatare
sensitive to. and involved with′ wider 一com unit土es of
interaction' that go beyond the corporation to include
competitors.customersand otherstake-holdersintheknowledge
creatingprocess･
Rnovledg.eCreatingNetvorks
A main theme of this report has been on intra-Organizational
knowledge creation but with the important caveat that
organizational members are part of wider 一cornmunities of
interaction" that span organizational boundaries. The
individualsthatmakeupanorganizationaremembersofvarious
"knowledgenetworks"that linkthem toinformationsourcesboth
within and outside theorganization･ Forexample,membersofa
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sales team might have both formal and infomal links with
customers ユinkswith customers that enable them to share tacit
expectations about product performance characteristics. This
mightenablethe salesteam togainanappreciationofwhat the
customerwantsevenbeforeit土sfully fom edin thecustomer's
mind. These"Windows"一一〇rinterfaces一一withtheoutsideworld
can takeavarietyofformsandoperateatevery organizational
level.
While it is important to note that knowledge-Creating networks
span organizational boundaries, the distinction between inside
and outsidetheorg■anizat土oniso王Someconsiderableimportance
when it comes to implementing strategies for creating new
knowledge･ Zt is the organization that providesthe resources
for 土tsmembersto 土nteractand collectively createnewwaysof
doingthings･ Organizationalstructures,rules,proceduresand
cultureallcombinetodefineaframeworkforcreating-knowledge.
moreove工●′theorg-anizationalframeworklsrelativelyfamiliarto
members一一especially 土nJapan′with 土tstraditiono王11fe-long
employment. ThecaseofCanon'sMini-copierShowedhow,within
such a framework′a cross-functio王ュalteam could be deployed to
overcomethetechnologicalbottlenecksassociatedwithproducing
a new type of copier. In COmParison, the study of Nissan's
revitalization showedhow amoreintegrated forum forknowledge
creationcouldbefosteredwlthlnacompanythathad 'sectlonalH
and stagnant.
From an organizational point of view knowledge creation that
involvesoutsidersisan土ntrinsicallyuncertainbus土ness･ While
infomal personal contacts can be conducted accord⊥ng■ to the
instincts of the lnd土vlduals involved. elevating.links with
outsiders to the level of formal "organizational policy'
representsavoyageintounknownwaters. Thecoreoftheproblem
is bound up with issues of trust and the "costs of
c011aboratlont-. Withoutmutual trust, the sharing.experiences
that are vital to knowledge creation will be stifled atbirth.
The case of the F土fth Generation Computer ProコeCt therefore
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provides an interesting insight into mechanisms for building
legitimacy in the spacethatexistsbetween organizations･
工nplementing Org.anizationalh ovledgeCreation
Xnowledgecreationinvolvesacontinualinterchangebetweenthe
advance and diffusion of new ways of doing things･ Knowledge
that isbelieved tohaveapotentialforexploitation 土Slikely
to attractattention from anwiderCircleof土nterestedparties
leading to an amplification of the "ontological dimension一〇f
knowledge creation･
The ability to generate and assimilateknowledge that can then
be translated into some fom ofcompetitiveadvantag■e 土sat the
veryheartofbusinessstrategy･ HoweverrasthestudyofNissan
showed. thequestionofappropriatevariety isbynomeanseasy
to determine.
Akeyrequirementforthecompetitiveorganizationisanability
to switch quickly between different 'fcontexts'l of knowledge
creation to accommodate the changing requirements that occur
withinandoutsidetheorganization･ Inconcludingthisreport,
wethereforeproposethe土deaofa"hypertextorganizat⊥on'-which
highlights some of the challenge for middle managers in
implementing effective knowledge creation･
The "hypertextorganization'drawsonananalogywiththeuseof
hypertext in computing,which refers to an ability to view a
large amount of information from many different angles. By
tellingthesamestory indifferentwaysitisoftenpossibleto
make new connectionsand insights that trigger the creation of
knowledge･ Organizationalknowledge creation embraces several
contexts associated with the acquisition, generation,
exploitation,andaccumulationofknowledge. Differentcontexts
tend toexhibittheirown characteristicswhichmakesthemmore
or lessappropriatetodifferentorganizationalmechanisms. Zn
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this connection,it is possible to distinguish two loosely
defined and overlapping dimensions to the context ofknowledge
creation･ On the one hand,there is novelty and uncertainty.
Won-hierarchicalselforganizingteamsareespeciallyappropriate
to the generation of fundamentally new knowledge through an
active search procedures･ This is likely to draw heavily on
socialization and external⊥zation. On the other hand. a
hierarchical division of labor can be more relevant to the
organization and development of relatively routine knowledge
creatingactiveswhereincrementaldevelopmentislocatedwithin
relativelystabletechnicalororganizationalparameters･ Thls
might be associated with the application and exploitation of
knowledgeWhichhasprogressedtowardsthedevelopmentendofthe
R&D spectrum. Zn terms of knowledge creation combination and
土nternallzation are likely tobeparticularlyprominent.
Thekeypoint tonote isthat thehypertextorganization should
recognize the respective rolesthat can be played by hierarchy
and heterarchy and switch between the mode according to the
requirementsofprevailingcircumstances･ Thisshouldenablethe
efficiency and stab土1土ty of h⊥erarchlcal organizations to be
combined with the creative potentialof cross-functional task-
forces.
The hypertext organization represents a potentmixture of= (i)
hierarchicalstructure--whichactsasaskeletonforefficient
andstableorganizationalprocesses,and;(2)lThorizontal.Itask-
forcesthatcutacrossorganizationalboundariespromoting 'free
thinking"and the re-conceptualization of established ways of
doing things. These contrasting features of an organization
relatetotwoverydifferent 一〇rganizationalrhythmsHwhichcan
noteasilybeharmonizedand′inconsequence,requiretheirom
Horganizational spaceH. The challenge for the hypertext
organization isto switchbetweentherhythmsin amannerwhich
is appropriate to any given Stage in a given Problem solving
process･ Thus′some aspects of a problem will strike a chord
with the need for harmony with the hierarchical mode′wh土1e
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otherswillbelessclearlydefinedandrequirethemorelateral
approachthatcanbeachievedbyacross-functionalprojectteam･
Ahypertextorganizationthereforehastobeawareofmechanisms
for integrating the disparate parts of its knowledge creating
processesand ensuring.that they are available for future use･
This integration function is achieved in a third dimension of
organizational activity which relates to f.knowledge base
management-I -- ie the sum ation ofhierarchy and heterarchy in
aknowledge-base layer･
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